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Using a sample of European abstract art we show that reservation prices constrain 
pre-auction estimates in such a way that we are more likely to observe overestimation 
relative to the midpoint of the estimation window. At the same time, we also find that the 
low pre-auction estimate is a more powerful, accurate and precise predictor of hammer 
prices than the high estimate. 
 
Key words: •Art Auctions, •Abstract Art, •Pre-auction Estimates, • Reservation Price, •Bias 
JEL Classification: D440, G120, Z110 
 
Rezumat 
  În  acest  articol  analizăm  un  eşantion  de  picturi  abstracte  de  provenienţă 
europeană şi descoperim că rezerva minimă de preţ a colecţionarilor care vând lucrările 
de artă la licitaţie constrâng evaluările şi prognozele specialiştilor. Ca urmare, este mai 
probabil ca preţurile realizate ulterior la licitaţie să fie în medie mai scăzute decât mijlocul 
intervalului  de  prognoză  al  specialiştilor.  Mai  mult,  constatăm  că  limita  inferioară  a 
intervalului de prognoză anticipează cu o precizie mai mare decât limita superioară preţul 
de licitaţie realizat ulterior. 
 
Cuvinte  cheie:  •  Licitaţii  de  artă  •  Pictură abstractă  • Estimări  de  preţ  •  Preţ  minim 
• Eroare de estimare 
Clasificare JEL: D440, G120, Z110 
 
Composition VI is a large rectangular oil painting. The canvas measures 195 by 300 
centimeters. The art critic of the time must have squinted in disbelief: It displays a tangle of 
abstract geometrical shapes and lines bathed by large evanescent streaks of blue, green, 
brown, and red. There are no trees, peoples, flowers, or any other figurative representation. 
On the lower right-hand corner the signature of the artist is  scribbled inconspicuously: 
Vassily Kandinsky, year 1913. 
Kandinsky  was  spearheading  a  radically  new  and  bold  approach  to  painting: 
abstractionism.  Abstract  forms  and  shapes  were  destined  to  replace  the  traditional 
landscapes and portraits. The painter knew very well that his art would become subject to 
controversy. And it did. Some art critics and fellow painters hailed him as a genius. Others 
were displeased and outraged by the aesthetic concepts that Kandinsky introduced to the 
world. In his native land, Russia, the Bolshevik party increasingly considered his art un-
proletarian  and  reactionary.  In  Germany,  the  Nazi  scorned  him  and  called  his  art 
“degenerate.” Only later did he become one of the most iconic abstract painters of all times. 
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Almost a century later, another type 
of  scrutiny  would  revolve  around  the 
selling  of  Kandindky’s  artwork.  The 
scholars  would  come  this  time  from  a 
different  field  of  study  –  finance  and 
economics;  and  they  too  espoused 
simplicity, symmetry, and elegance. Just 
like  Kandinsky,  these  economists  were 
about  to  learn  that  simplicity  and 
elegance  does  not  always  rely  on 
symmetry.  
 
1.  Introduction 
 
There  is  a  growing  body  of  recent 
research  preoccupied  with  the 
relationship  between  pre-auction 
estimates  and  hammer  prices  at  art 
auctions. These studies draw heavily on 
financial and economics concepts such as 
market  efficiency  and  unbiased 
estimators.  A  large  majority  of  studies 
set out to determine whether the average 
of the low and high pre-auction estimates 
(the  midpoint  of  the  pre-auction 
estimation  window)  is  indeed  an 
unbiased estimator of realized (hammer) 
prices.  The  midpoint  of  the  estimation 
interval  emerged  as  a  reference  point 
following  the  theoretical  work  of 
Milgrom  and  Weber  (1982).  Moreover, 
the average of the low and high estimates 
has its own appeal because it stands for 
simplicity  and  symmetry.  Many 
subsequent  studies  produced  evidence 
supporting the following results: no bias 
at all, slight underestimation, and slight 
overestimation.  
Here,  we contend that  the question 
of the midpoint of the estimation window 
is  a  red  herring.  In  an  ideal  world  it 
would most likely represent an unbiased 
estimator of hammer prices. Alas, there 
are  plenty  of  market  imperfections 
around  to  guarantee  some  sort  of  bias. 
We feel that it is more interesting to ask 
a  different  question:  what  are  the  most 
relevant  constraints,  and  how  do  they 
influence the pre-auction estimates?  
We  argue  that  reservation  prices 
probably  have  a  strong  influence  in 
swaying the pre-auction estimates. This 
constraint  is  likely  to  induce  the 
appearance of overestimation. Moreover, 
we should be able to detect a difference 
in how each individual estimate predicts 
the price. In the end, we find that the low 
estimate  has  a  higher  prediction  power 
than the high estimate with respect to the 
hammer price. 
Our  paper  is  structured  as  follows: 
Section two briefly introduces to reader 
to  the  mechanism  of  art  auctions. 
Sections three, four, and five discuss the 
literature  on  art  auctions.  Sections  six 
and  seven  elaborate  on  the  main 
hypothesis  of  our  research.  Sections 
eight  and  nine  present  the  data, 
methodology,  and  results.  Section  ten 
concludes.  
 
2.  Art Auctions 
 
The mechanism for the auctioning of 
art is straightforward: Each lot is sold to 
the highest bidder. A lot usually consists 
of one object or a group of objects sold 
as  one.  In  the  case  of  paintings,  a  lot 
consists of one painting.  
The  entire  process  starts  when  the 
owner of the artwork contacts the auction 
house  with  the  intention  to  sell.  The 
artwork is examined by specialists  who 
determine its approximate worth. Based 
on  this  analysis,  the  auction  house 
produces a low and a high estimate of the 
artwork’s expected value. The breadth of 
the pre-auction estimate range can vary 
considerably,  depending  on  many 
factors;  among  these  factors,  the 
minimum price that the owner is willing 
to  accept  –called reserve  or reservation 
price  –  plays  a  particularly  interesting 
role.  For  reasons  that  are  obvious,  the 
pre-auction  estimate  range  is  set  above Economic Interferences  AE 
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the  reservation  price.  The  reservation 
price  is  mutually  agreed  upon  by  the 
owner  of  the  artwork  and  the  auction 
house.  In  negotiating  the  level  of  the 
reservation price, the auction house has 
to be persuasive, yet flexible. In the end, 
the owner will not agree to consign the 
artwork  unless  the  seller  guarantees  a 
minimum  price  perceived  as  a  fair 
compensation  for  parting  with  the 
artwork. 
The pre-auction estimate, along with 
other pertinent information relating to the 
artwork is published well in advance of 
the  auction  date.  Potential  buyers  can 
gather  relevant  information  by 
subscribing to a catalog (featuring  high 
quality  graphics)  or  directly  online, 
where more sellers provide increasingly 
better quality digital images. On the day 
of the sale, the artwork is brought in and 
becomes subject to bidding. The bidding 
price  advances  in  increments,  whose 
magnitude  depends  on  the  pre-auction 
estimate. The highest bidder (at the time 
when the hammer falls) is acknowledged 
as the buyer. If the artwork fails to reach 
the reservation price, it is bought-in and 
subsequently  returned  to  its  original 
owner.  
  Following a successful sale, the 
owner (consignor) receives the hammer 
price  less  the  seller’s  commission;  the 
commission represents a flat percentage 
of the hammer price or can be set on a 
sliding  scale,  depending  on  the 
auctioneer. The buyer pays the hammer 
price, a buyer’s premium, and applicable 
sales  or  VAT  taxes.  The  buyer’s 
premium  can  also  be  applied  as  a  flat 
percentage or as a sliding scale fraction 
of the hammer price.  
In this entire process outlined above, 
we  will  focus  on  the  reservation  price, 
which  plays  a  particular  role,  so  far 
underestimated  or  ignored.  As  it  will 
become  clearer  later,  the  reservation 
price  represents  one  of  the  main 
constraints affecting the valuation of art. 
 
3.  Incentives to Underestimate 
 
Many authors cite statements made 
by  auction  house  professionals  who 
claim that estimates are tweaked down in 
an attempt to lure more bidders [D’Souza 
and  Prentice  (2001),  Lourgand  and 
McDaniel  (1991),  Mei  and  Moses 
(2005)]. Obviously, too high an estimate 
would discourage a great many potential 
buyers. 
Another  conjecture  proposes  that 
artificially  low  estimates  compel  the 
seller  to  a  lower  reservation  price,  and 
thereby increase the probability of selling 
the artwork. This argument relies on the 
assumption that the auction house expert 
produces  the  high  and  low  estimates 
independent of seller’s expectations. This 
contention would weaken considerably if 
the seller were in a position to influence 
or negotiate the reservation price. 
  On  a  different  level, 
underestimation  will lead to  a string of 
pleasant  surprises  for  sellers,  who  see 
their  hopes  and  expectations  exceeded. 
This  situation  is  akin  to  the  earnings 
game  played  by  some  publicly  held 
corporations  that  underestimate  their 
current results in an attempt to surprise 
the  market  with  better  than  expected 
results in the future.  
Finally, big auction houses, such as 
Christie’s  and  Sotheby’s  have  a 
reputation  to  defend  [Mei  and  Moses, 
(2005)],  and  therefore  the  image  of 
respectably and wisdom is preserved and 
enhanced by erring on the side of caution 
and  conservatism.  These  auctioneers 
might  look  foolish  and  careless  if  the 
artwork  consistently  failed  to  fetch  the 
expected price.  
Several  studies  already  document 
the  existence  of  this  sort  of  bias. 
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Christie’s underestimates systematically, 
while  Sotheby’s  underestimates 
expensive  pieces.  In  the  same  vein, 
Chanel  et  al.  (1996)  find  that  the  pre-
auction estimates  for jewellery auctions 
are systematically below hammer prices. 
D’Souza  and  Prentice  (2001)  produce 
similar  findings  from  a  sample  that 
includes  European  and  Australian  art. 
Ekelund  et  al.  (1998)  find  that  in  18 
years  out  of  20,  the  average  price  of 
artwork  was  larger  than  the  average 
guess.  The  authors  investigated  Latin 
American  Art  auctions  conducted  by 
Christie’s  and  Sotheby’s  between  1977 
and  1996.  Beggs  and  Graddy  (1997) 
reveal  that  larger  paintings  -  especially 
Impressionist  Art  -tend  to  be 
underestimated  by  the  experts.  This 
finding  could  reflect  a  purposeful 
strategy,  or  might  simply  reveal 
overestimation  of  the  demand  for 
Contemporary  Art  and  underestimation 
of  the  demand  for  large  pieces 
[Ashenfelter and Graddy (2006)].  
 
4.  Incentives to Overestimate 
 
There are also reasons why experts 
could overestimate the value of art. First, 
a  higher  estimate  would  induce  more 
sellers to consign their artworks. Too low 
an  estimate  would  depress  the 
reservation price and thereby discourage 
artwork  owners  from  consigning  their 
art. This argument relies heavily on the 
assumption that the determination of the 
reservation price is residual in nature.  
Second,  consider  the  seller’s 
commission  and  the  buyer’s  premium. 
Both are proportional to the price fetched 
by  the  artwork.  If  it  is  believed  that 
higher  estimates  will  result  in  higher 
hammer  prices,  overestimation  will 
produce  higher  revenues  for  the 
auctioneers  [Mei  and  Moses  (2005), 
Ashenfelter and Graddy (2004)]. 
Some  studies  seem  to  confirm  that 
experts’  estimates  are  biased  upwards. 
Beggs  and  Graddy  (1997)  find  that 
recently  executed  Contemporary  Art 
pieces  tend  to  be  overestimated. 
Bauwens and Ginsburgh (2000) find that 
Sotheby’s  experts  overvalue  some 
English  Silver  sold  between  1976  and 
1991.  Mei  and  Moses  (2005)  find  that 
high  estimates  are  associated  with 
subsequent  adverse  abnormal  return  for 
periods  of  up  to  thirty  years.  These 
authors  conclude  that  auction  houses 
overestimate expensive artworks in order 
to  reap  maximum  commissions  and 
premiums.  Last but not least, Ekelund et 
al. (1998) find an overall  mean bias of 
2.7  percent,  which  suggests 
overestimation. 
 
5.  Honesty as the Best Policy 
   
There  is  a  case  to  be  made  for 
unbiasedness  as  well.  These  arguments 
largely  fall  in  two  categories:  a) 
theoretical – based on economic rational 
behavior,  and  b)  ad-hoc  –  based  on 
intuition,  common  sense,  and  the 
preponderance of evidence: 
 
a) There is a consecrated theoretical 
literature  contending  that  in  a  world  of 
rational economic agents the best policy 
of auction houses is to estimate artwork 
as  accurately  as  possible;  this  is  the 
“honesty-is-the-best-policy”  argument 
[Milgrom  and  Weber  (1982)].  One  can 
easily  extend  the  informational 
efficiency  case  to  the  art  market 
[Lourgand  and  McDaniel  (1991)]. 
Auction  houses  would  lose  business  to 
the  competition  if  they  over-  or 
underestimated the artwork. While small 
or temporary biases might exist here and 
there,  rational  learning  would  eliminate 
them  in  the  long  run  [Mei  and  Moses 
(2005)]. 
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b) For every economic incentive in 
favor of a positive bias there is another 
one supporting a negative bias. On one 
hand, auctioneers might underestimate in 
order to attract bidders, but on the other 
hand  they  could  also  overestimate  to 
attract  sellers.  One  cannot  really  know 
ex-ante the net strength of the influences 
discussed earlier; however, intuition and 
common  sense  suggest  that  the  truth 
must lie somewhere in the middle. The 
most  likely  scenario  is  that  expected 
prices  equal  realized  prices.  This 
intuition  is  reinforced  by  the  peculiar 
alternating  pattern  of  studies 
documenting  both  upward  bias  and 
downward bias (it appears, however, that 
the  preponderance  of  evidence  tilts 
marginally  in  favor  of  slight 
overestimation). 
 
Sure  enough,  there  is  also  a 
substantial  body  of  empirical  literature 
supporting  unbiasedness.  Abowd  and 
Ashenfelter  (1989)  suggest  that  pre-
auction estimates are better predictors of 
prices  than  hedonic  price  functions. 
Ashenfelter (1989) contends that experts’ 
estimate  are  truthful  in  the  sense  that 
they are unbiased predictors of art prices. 
Lourgand and McDaniel (1991) research 
Sotheby’s  auctions  of  Americana  and 
conclude  that  buyers  and  sellers 
participate  in  a  fair  game.  Finally, 
Czujak  and  Martins  (2004)  investigate 
Sotheby’s  and  Christie’s  auctions  of 
Picasso  paintings  between  1975  and 
1994;  the  authors  find  that  pre-auction 
estimates  represent  good  predictors  of 
the subsequent hammer price.  
 
6.  Of Estimates and Prices: Ockham’s 
Razor 
 
Until  now,  the  debate  on  art 
estimates has produced evidence that is 
ambiguous.  This  predicament  is  hardly 
unusual  given  the  nature  of  scientific 
inquiry.  Many  studies  present 
contradictory  findings  indeed: 
Ashenfelter  and  Graddy  (2006)  appear 
convinced  that  expert’s  estimates  are 
truthful,  although  he  acknowledges  the 
legitimacy of studies that beg to differ. 
Lourgand and McDaniel (1991) declare 
art  auctions  a  fair  game,  although  they 
concede that some sort of bias might be 
present,  which  the  authors  dismiss  as 
small. Ekelund et al. (1998) acknowledge 
that  –  although  in  a  majority  of 
observation cases the estimate is below 
the hammer price – the overall mean of 
the bias is in fact positive, at 2.7 percent. 
The  most  common  answer  to  this 
empirical  conundrum,  unfortunately,  is 
to  declare  any  bias  that  might  exist  as 
insignificant.  Alas,  to  accept  this 
conclusion  outright,  without  further 
questioning, requires a leap of faith.  
  In  this  paper,  we  contend  that, 
due  to  the  ubiquitous  nature  of 
reservation prices, it is more probable to 
observe over- than underestimation. As a 
telltale sign, the low estimate should be a 
more  powerful,  accurate  and  lower 
variance  predictor  of  the  expected 
hammer  price.  Our  conjecture  is 
developed  based  on  the  following 
observations: 
 
a)The  case  put  forth  by  the 
theoretical work of Milgrom and Weber 
(1982) does not account for the existence 
reservation  prices.  Once  we  allow 
reservation prices, it is not clear whether 
we should continue to expect pre-auction 
estimates  to  remain  an  unbiased 
estimator of hammer prices.  
b)The  reservation  price  is  not 
residual in nature; and the lower bound 
of the estimation interval is dependent on 
the reservation price negotiated with the 
seller.  Ekelund  et  al.  (1998)  find  that 
smaller estimation intervals increase the 
probability  of  “no  sale.”  The  authors 
speculate  that  the  estimation  interval AE  Economic Interferences 
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becomes  smaller  whenever  the  owner 
requires a higher reservation price. Their 
findings  suggest  that  the  art  owner  has 
bargaining power. 
c)A  substantial  body  of  empirical 
evidence  documents  both 
underestimation  and  overestimation. 
These biases –small as they might be – 
appear  to  vary  from  one  particular 
instance  to  the  other.  In  the  end, 
however, we feel that the preponderance 
of evidence points to overestimation. 
 
Reservation prices are interesting for 
three  reasons.  First,  they  lead  to  an 
upward adjustment in the low estimate. 
When the seller seeks a reservation price 
higher than the experts’ low estimate, the 
auctioneer  might  have  to  raise  the  low 
estimate  if  it  has  in  place  a  policy 
requiring the reservation price be below 
the low estimate. The auctioneer would 
probably  try  to  persuade  the  seller  to 
lower  the  reservation  price,  but  in  the 
end  the  outcome  of  the  negotiating 
process  depends  very  much  on 
conjectural  factors,  such  as  bargaining 
power.  Once  a  compromise  reservation 
price  has  been  reached,  the  auctioneer 
has  no  choice  but  to  increase  its  low 
estimate if the reservation price is above 
the original low estimate. If the expected 
price was originally centered on the mid-
point of the best of experts’-knowledge 
estimation,  after  the  adjustment,  the 
expected  price  moves  off-center,  closer 
to the low estimate. 
Second,  reservation  prices  truncate 
the distribution of the observed hammer 
price.  They  ensure  that  we  would  not 
encounter  instances  of  realized  prices 
below  the  reservation  price.  If  the 
competitive  bidding  process  fails  to 
reach the formal or informal reservation 
price,  the  painting  would  either  be 
bought-in  by  the  auctioneer,  or  re-
purchased by its owner. Whether it goes 
unsold or is sold at the reservation price, 
the result is the same: the realized price 
would  be  precluded  from  descending 
below  the  limit  set  by  the  reservation 
price.  Because  reservation  prices  are 
close to the low estimate, the distribution 
of the observed realized hammer prices 
would  be  truncated  about  the  low 
estimate. Intuitively, we then expect that 
the low estimate be a better predictor of 
the price than the high estimate. 
Third,  while  reservation  prices  are 
hard  to  estimate  with  precision,  their 
influence on the competitive bidding at 
art actions is not trivial. We thus have to 
rely on circumstantial evidence in order 
to  isolate  the  influence  of  reservation 
prices from the influence of other factors. 
We  need  to  conjecture  the  type  of 
disturbances they are likely to induce in 
the  observed  art  auction  data  and 
formulate testable hypotheses. 
 
7.  Development of Hypotheses 
   
Let us assume an ideal world where 
the  unbiased  estimator  of  the  expected 
hammer price is a  weighted average of 





                                        (1) 
 
Where: 
E(P) = expected hammer price 
L
A = the best of experts’-knowledge 
high estimate 
H
A = the best of experts’-knowledge 
high estimate and 0< θ < 1  
 
In the absence of reservation prices 
or  any  other  ex-ante  constraints  on  the 





A)   
       
        (2) 
 Economic Interferences  AE 
 
 Nr. 24 • Iunie 2008  263 
Unbiasedness  requires  that  the 
midpoint of the estimation interval equal 
the expected hammer price: 
 
E(P) = M = (0.5)(H
A + L
A)        
        (2a) 
 
Where: 
M = the midpoint of the estimation 
interval 
 
When the estimator is unbiased, the 
relative distance of the expected hammer 
price from the low estimate should equal 
in absolute value the relative distance of 
the expected hammer price from the high 
estimate. Moreover, the variance of the 
relative distance of the expected hammer 
price from the low estimate should equal 
the  variance  of  the  relative  distance  of 
the expected hammer price from the high 
estimate. This is to say that the expected 
price is an equally weighted-average of 
the low and high estimates. Hence, in the 
absence of any constraint, the following 
relationships should hold: 
 
1 – L
A/ E(P) = H
A/ E(P) – 1    
       
      (3) 
 
VAR(1 – L
A/ P) = VAR(H
A/ P – 1)        
             
        (4) 
 
In  the  presence  of  a  reservation 
price, we infer that the expected hammer 
price  cannot  be  lower  than  the 
reservation price: 
 
E(P) = MAX[ (0.5)(H
A + L
A); S]   
       
      (5) 
 
Where: 
S = the reservation price 
 
However, we are not able to observe 
any hammer price lower than S.  If the 
bidding  process  fails  to  reach  S,  the 
painting would be bought in. Recall that 
many auction houses, notably Sotheby’s 
and  Christie’s  have  policies  requiring 
that the low estimate be above the formal 
reservation price. If this is the case, the 
auctioneer will have to readjust the level 
of the low estimate upward. We would 
no longer be able to observe L
A, only L, 
which is higher than L
A such that: 
 
S < L 




A  < L    
        (7) 
 
Where: 
L  =  the  observed  pre-auction  low 
estimate 
 
We believe that the adjustment (L - 
L
A) has to be minimal. It is very likely 
that after the adjustment  L  will be less 
than (0.5)(H
A + L
A). If the observed low 
estimate  were  greater  than  the  original 
mid-point,  the  expected  hammer  price 
would  descend  below  the  observed 
estimation window. It is hard to believe 
that  an  auction  house  that  thrives  on 
reputation for expertise would knowingly 
set  the  pre-auction  estimates  in  such  a 
way  that  it  would  expect  the  price  to 
systematically  end  up  below  the  low 




A – L)  






A – L)    
           (8a) 
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Where: 
0 < k < 1        
Given (7), we now hypothesize the 
following: 
 
1 – L / E(P) < H
A / E(P) – 1      
        (9)                                                    
 
VAR(1 – L / P) < VAR (H
A / P – 1) 
        (10) 
 
With  reservation  prices,  we  expect 
that the relative distance of the expected 
hammer  price  from  the  observed  low 
estimate  be  less  in  absolute  value  than 
the  relative  distance  of  the  expected 
hammer  price  from  the  high  estimate. 
Moreover,  the  variance  of  the  relative 
distance  of  the  expected  hammer  price 
from the low estimate should be less than 
the  variance  of  the  relative  distance  of 
the expected hammer price from the high 
estimate. In other words, in the presence 
of  reservation  prices,  we  expect  the 
observed  low  estimate  to  be  a  more 
accurate  predictor  of  the  hammer  price 
than the high estimate. We also expect to 
find that the low estimate tends to be a 
lower  variance  predictor  of  hammer 
prices than the  high estimate. We have 
assumed no constraints on H
A as a result 
of  reservation  prices.  We  contend  that 
the  best  of  experts’-knowledge  high 
estimate will continue to be observable. 
In addition, we conjecture that the extent 
of overestimation, if any, increases with 
the width of the estimation window; this 
is  not  so  obvious  a  result.  To  see  how 
this is possible consider the following: 
By  substituting  (6),  (7),  and  (8)  in 
(5), it follows that: 
 
E(P) = MAX [(0.5)(1-k)(H
A + L) ; S]  




E(P) – L = MAX [(0.5)(1-k)(H
A – L) ;  (-R)]     
                     (12) 
Where: 
R = L – S 
 
Here,  we  conjecture  that  the 
observed lower estimate (L) is simply a 
linear  transformation  of  the  reservation 
price  (S).  Since  (0.5)(1-k)  is  obviously 
less than 0.5, it follows that as (H
A – L) 
increases,  E(P)  drifts  more  and  more 
towards L, which is akin to saying that 
the  extent  of  observed  overestimation 
increases  with  the  width  of  the 
estimation window. 
Alternatively,  we  can  re-formulate 




A  =  Max  [-(0.5)(1+k)(H
A-L);    - 
(H
A–L) –R ]        
                (13) 
   
Obviously, the interpretation of (13) 
is similar to that of (12) with one notable 
exception:  we  expect  the  width  of  the 
estimation  window  (H
A  –  L)  to  have 
more explanatory power in equation (13) 
than in equation (12).  
 
8.  Data 
 
We  chose  a  relatively  homogenous 
sample of observations in an attempt to 
control for subject matter. Our panel data 
consists  of  major  modern  European 
artists.  The  source  of  data  is  ADEC 
International, a Paris-based organization 
gathering  and  organizing  auction  data 
from  around  the  world.  The  period 
covered ranges from 1986 to 2003. We 
require 150 valid observations to include 
a  painter  in  our  sample.  Since  we  are 
convinced  that  subject  matter  is  one  of 
the least quantifiable determinants of art 
prices  –  we  include  only  abstract  
(non-figurative)  art.  In  the  end,  four 
painters  have  been  selected:  Vassily 
Kandinsky,  Juan  Miro,  Paul  Klee,  and 
Karel Appel.  All these four artists share Economic Interferences  AE 
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a  strong  stylistic  and  conceptual 
connection.  
The  Russian-born  Vassily 
Kandinsky is considered on of the main 
pre-cursors  of  modern  abstract 
expressionism. He founded the legendary 
group  Der  Blaue  Reiter  (The  Blue 
Rider). Kandinsky wrote one of the first 
theoretical  treatises  on  abstraction;  he 
also held academic positions in Moscow, 
during  and  after  the  Bolshevik 
Revolution,  and  in  Germany,  where  he 
taught  at  the  Bauhaus.  Both  the 
Bolsheviks  and  Nazis  regarded 
Kandinsky’s  unconventional  art  with 
deep suspicion. The Nazis included 57 of 
his  paintings  in  the  “Degenerate  Art” 
exhibition.  A  vanguard  of  pure 
abstraction in art, Kandinsky paved the 
way  for  the  ascent  of  abstract 
expressionism in the post-World War II 
era.  He  remains  one  of  the  most 
influential artists of the XXth Century. 
 
The  Swiss-born  Paul  Klee  came 
from  a  family  of  musicians  and  almost 
became a musician himself. Eventually, 
Klee  opted  for  a  painting  career;  he 
joined Der Blaue Reiter, and later taught 
at  Bauhaus  in  Germany,  where  he  met 
Kandinsky  and  was  influenced  by  his 
artistic concepts. Just like Kandinsky, he 
fled  Germany  in  the  wake  of  the  Nazi 
rise to power, and just like Kandinsky he 
saw his paintings labeled as “Degenerate 
Art.”  Later  Klee  came  down  with  a 
terrible  disease  –  scleroderma  -  that 
forced  him  to  reconsider  his  technique 
and  eventually  killed  him.  Klee  is 
considered as one of the most achieved 
colorists of all times and one of the most 
celebrated  abstract  painters  of  the  last 
century. 
   
Juan Miro was born in Spain and his 
ascent to fame took place in the shadow 
of Pablo Picasso. His parents wanted him 
to have decent job, so he was trained to 
become  an  accountant,  but  eventually 
turned  to  painting.  Just  like  Kandinsky 
and  Klee,  he  was  influenced  by  post-
impressionists and fauvists. As a young 
artist  he  moved  to  Paris,  where  Ernest 
Hemingway  bought  one  of  his  largest 
canvases. After an initial surrealist phase, 
Miro  became  increasingly  interested  in 
abstractionism  and  developed  a  unique 
style  that  is  now  widely  recognized  as 
the hallmark of the Catalan painter
1. 
 
The  Dutch-born  Karel  Appel  was 
initially  inspired  by  early  abstract 
painting, but later became a major player 
in  the  rise  of  the  modern  European 
Abstract  Expressionism.  He  influenced 
and  was  influenced  by  the  work  of 
Jackson Pollock  and  fellow  countryman 
Willem de Koonig. He was also a founder 
of  the  European  group  CoBra.  Sample 
statistics are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 -  Sample statistics. All dollar numbers are per square inch.  
 M (Mid-point of the estimation window) = (L+H
A)/2 
  Vassily 
Kandinsky  Paul Klee  Juan Miro  Karel Appel  Total sample 
           
Number of paintings  194  427  646  1,041  2,308 
Average low estimate  $307,804.45  $157,325.61  $233,538.12  $21,609.06  $130,092.18 
Median low estimate  $123,850.00  $60,000.00  $50,000.00  $10,000.00  $25,000.00 
Average high estimate  $435,977.83  $214,621.08  $340,360.25  $29,324.25  $184,844.96 
Median high estimate  $177,364.87  $81,900.00  $62,720.00  $13,820.80  $32,083.60 
Average hammer price  $415,006.24  $180,403.74  $319,819.19  $25,591.02  $169,318.48 
Median hammer price  $143,447.50  $70,000.00  $55,000.00  $11,647.00  $27,761.50 
P below L (%)  26.29%  31.38%  28.33%  26.71%  27.99% 
P between Land H (%)  40.21%  36.53%  38.85%  43.52%  40.64% 
P above H (%)  33.51%  32.08%  32.82%  29.78%  31.37% AE  Economic Interferences 
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  Vassily 
Kandinsky  Paul Klee  Juan Miro  Karel Appel  Total sample 
Price above M (%)  49.48%  44.26%  49.85%  45.92%  47.01% 
Average (1- L/ P)  11.41%  7.79%  13.54%  8.85%  10.18% 
Median (1- L/ P)  11.00%  8.00%  14.00%  11.00%  11.00% 
Average. (1- M/ P)  -5.74%  -10.06%  -2.69%  -7.61%  -6.53% 
Median (1- M/ P)  -2.00%  -7.00%  -2.00%  -5.00%  -4.00% 
Average. (1- H/ P)  -22.91%  -27.95%  -18.93%  -23.98%  -23.21% 
Median (1- H/ P)  -16.00%  -21.00%  -15.00%  -20.00%  -19.00% 
 
In  total,  the  sample  contains  2,308 
artworks. Almost half of them, 1,041 are 
paintings by Karel Appel. Miro has 646 
works,  Klee  427,  and  Kandinsky  only 
194 artworks. Kandinsky also appears to 
be  the  most  expensive  painter,  mostly 
because  many  of  his  canvases  are  very 
large. Karel Appel is the least expensive. 
In terms of dollars per square inch, Paul 
Klee  is  in  fact  more  expensive  than 
Kandinsky.  Klee’s  artworks  tend  to  be 
small  in  size.  We  note  that  the 
distribution of pre-auction estimates and 
prices tends to be rather skewed; in the 
case of each painter there is a handful of 
“masterpieces” that pushes the averages 
very high. As well, oil on canvas is more 
expensive,  while  watercolors  on  paper 
are less expensive – this fact provides a 
partial  explanation  for  the  skewness  of 
the price distribution of our sample
2. 
Ekelund  et  al.  (1998)  adopt  two 
approaches  to  defining  and  measuring 
overestimation (or underestimation). The 
first one considers the relative frequency 
of  hammer  price  outcomes  below  (or 
above) the estimation interval mid-point. 
The second one considers the distance of 
the  hammer  price  from  the  estimation 
window mid-point, low, or high estimate. 
The  overestimation  that  we  document 
here  is  less  equivocal  than  the  one 
recorded  by  Ekelund  et  al.  (1998). 
Overall, our sample shows that in 53% of 
cases, the hammer price was below the 
average  of  the  high  and  low  estimates. 
This  pattern  holds  for  each  individual 
painter  as  well.  The  last  six  lines  of 
Table 1 deal with the second approach to 
measuring  overestimation  –  they  show 
the relative price distance from the mid-
point  of  the  estimation  window,  low 
estimate, and high estimate. The relative 
distance  from  the  mid-point  of  the 
estimation  window  is  small,  yet 
consistently  and  significantly  negative, 
solidly placing our findings in the camp 
of overestimation. The relative distance 
of  the  hammer  price  from  the  low 
estimate  (10.3%)  is  lower  in  absolute 
value  than  the  the  distance  of  the 
hammer  price  form  the  high  estimate 
(23.16%) – as predicted by equation (9). 
In addition, the standard deviation of the 
relative  distance  of  the  hammer  price 
from  the  low  estimate  (49%)  is  lower 
than  the  standard  deviation  of  the 
distance of the hammer price form the  
high  estimate  (80.26%)  –  as 
predicted  by  equation  (10).  These 
differences  are  significant  at  the  1% 
level.  
 
9.  Empirical Tests 
 
The task at hand now is to estimate 
the coefficient of (H
A-L) empirically. In 
keeping  with  the  tradition  of  previous 
studies,  we  also  include  the  estimation 
window  midpoint.  Hence,  we  use  the 
following model specifications:  
 
(P-L) = a0 + a1(H
A-L) +  aiΣ Xi + e  
        (14) 
 
(P-M) = b0 + b1(H
A-L) + biΣ Xi + e  
        (15) 
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(P–H
A) = c0 + c1(H
A-L) + ciΣ Xi + e  




P= the observed hammer price 
 




A = the observed pre-auction high 
estimate 
 
Xi  =  Dummy  variables  accounting 
for  artist  reputation,  media,  canvas 
orientation auction houses, location, and 
the years 1987 – 2003 
Note that the  model is specified in 
linear form so that we can interpret the 
coefficients  a1,  b1,  and  c1.  We  are  not 
particularly interested in the coefficients 
of  the  yearly  dummies  because  we  are 
not  seeking  art  price  indices.  A  log 
specification would allow us to estimate 
price  indices,  but  it  would  render  the 
interpretation  of  other  coefficients 
intractable.  If M is an unbiased estimator 
of E(P) we would expect a1 to be equal 
to 0.5,  b1 to be equal to 0, and c1 equal 
to  -0.5.  If,  however,  we  expect  M  to 
overestimate  E(P),  and  this 
overestimation  is  increasing  with  the 
width  of  the  estimation  window, 
consistent  with our argument illustrated 
by equations (12) and (13), we predict a1 
to be less than 0.5,  b1 to be less than 0, 
and c1 to be less  than -0.5. Finally, we 
predict a1 to be larger than 0.5, b1 to be 
larger than 0, and c1 to be larger than -
0.5.  Given  the  results  in  Table  1,  we 
obviously expect overestimation.  
 
 
Table 2 Regression results. The absolute price distance from the low estimate (P-L), estimation window mid-
point (P-M). and high estimate (P-H
A) is regressed against the observed width of the estimation window (H
A-L), 
and a series of dummy variables accounting for the identity of the painters (MIRRO, APPEL, KLEE), the medium 
used (DMED =1 for oil on canvas), the orientation of the canvas (ORIENTD =1 for landscape-oriented canvases, 
the years 1987 through 2003 (Y1987 – Y2003), the location of the auction (PARISD = 1 for Paris, NYCD = 1, for 
New  York,  LONDOND  =  1  for  London,  AMSTERD  =  1  for  Amsterdam),    and  the  auctioneer  (CHRISTIE, 
SOTHEBYS). All regression coefficients are un-standardized. T-Statistics significant at the level of 5% and below 
are identified with *.  
 
   (P-L)      (P-M)      (P-H
A)     
                   
     Std. Error  t  Sig.  Std. Error  t  Sig.  Std. Error  t 
                 
Const.  18.828 13.210 1.425 18.8. 13.210  1.425 18.8. 13.210 1.425 
 MIRO   -7.953 7.721 -1.030 -7.95 7.721  -1.030 -7.95 7.721 -1.030 
 APPEL  -29.865 7.965 -3.750* -29.87 7.965  -3.750* -29.87 7.965 -3.750* 
 KLEE  -10.640 8.212 -1.206 -10.63 8.212  -1.206 -10.63 8.212 -1.206 
 DMED  9.984 4.633 2.155* 9.984 4.633  2.155* 9.984 4.633 2.155* 
 ORIENTD  -2.720 3.922 -0.693 -2.720 3.922  -0.693 -2.720 3.922 -0.693 
 Y1987  -32.028 21.262 -1.506 -32.028 21.262  -1.506 -32.028 21.262 -1.506 
 Y1988  6.855 22.679 0.302 6.855 22.679  0.302 6.855 22.679 0.302 
 Y1989  12.332 23.452 0.526 12.332 23.452  0.526 12.332 23.452 0.526 
 Y1990  18.789 18.213 1.032 18.789 18.213  1.032 18.789 18.213 1.032 
 Y1991  9.705 32.380 0.300 9.705 32.380  0.300 9.705 32.380 0.300 
 Y1992  -18.532 15.816 -1.172 -18.532 15.816  -1.172 -18.532 15.816 -1.172 
 Y1993  -13.964 12.208 -1.144 -13.964 12.208  -1.144 -13.964 12.208 -1.144 
 Y1994  -14.871 11.885 -1.251 -14.871 11.885  -1.251 -14.871 11.885 -1.251 
 Y1995  -7.961 11.995 -0.664 -7.961 11.995  -0.664 -7.961 11.995 -0.664 
 Y1996  -2.211 11.755 -0.188 -2.211 11.755  -0.188 -2.211 11.755 -0.188 
 Y1997  -7.981 11.509 -0.693 -7.981 11.509  -0.693 -7.981 11.509 -0.693 
 Y1998  -4.954 11.197 -0.442 -4.954 11.197  -0.442 -4.954 11.197 -0.442 
 Y1999  3.486 11.338 0.307 3.486 11.338  0.307 3.486 11.338 0.307 AE  Economic Interferences 
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 Y2000  -10.370 12.044 -0.861 -10.370 12.044  -0.861 -10.370 12.044 -0.861 
 Y2001  5.675 11.826 0.480 5.675 11.826  0.480 5.675 11.826 0.480 
 Y2002  3.739 11.701 0.320 3.739 11.701  0.320 3.739 11.701 0.320 
 Y2003  -0.222 14.338 -0.015 -.222 14.338  -0.015 -.222 14.338 -0.015 
 PARISD  7.850 8.769 0.895 7.850 8.769  0.895 7.850 8.769 0.895 
 NYCD  -3.075 12.513 -0.246 -3.075 12.513  -0.246 -3.075 12.513 -0.246 
 LONDOND  -7.078 12.512 -0.566 -7.078 12.512  -0.566 -7.078 12.512 -0.566 
 AMSTERD  -7.160 13.372 -0.535 -7.160 13.372  -0.535 -7.160 13.372 -0.535 
 CHRISTIE  27.309 12.560 2.174* 27.309 12.560  2.174* 27.309 12.560 2.174* 
 SOTHEBYS  12.008 12.832 0.936 12.008 12.832  0.936 12.008 12.832 0.936 
 (H
A-L)  0.249 .021 11.744* -0.251 0.2 -35.372* -0.75 0.2 -35.372* 
Adj-R2  0.091 0.06   0.36  






Regression results are presented 
in  Table  2.  The  most  straightforward 
result is that the coefficients a1, b1, and c1 
are  less  than  0.5,  0,  and  –0.5 
respectively, which is consistent with an 
overestimation that is increasing with the 
width  of  the  estimation  window. 
Equation  (14)  shows  the  coefficient  of 
(H
A-L)  at  0.249  (the  number  is 
statistically different from 0.5), equation 
(15) shows the coefficient of (H
A-L) at -
0.251  (the  number  is  statistically 
different  from  0),  and  equation  (16) 
shows the coefficient of (H
A-L) at -0.75 
(the number is statistically different from 
–0.5). We interpret this as confirmation 
that  (P-L)  grows  at  a  slower  rate  than 
(H
A-L).  In  other  words,  our  paintings 
tend  to  become  overestimated  to  a 
greater  extent  (or  underestimated  to  a 
lesser extent) as the estimation window 
widens. Since wider estimation windows 
are  associated  with  more  expensive 
pieces,  we offer corroborating evidence 
to the findings of Mei and Moses (2005) 
that more expensive paintings tend to be 
overestimated to a greater extent.  
The  inclusion  of  Christie’s  in 
the sample causes the expected (P-L) to 
grow,  thus  decreasing  the  likelihood  of 
overestimation;  the  same  is  true  of 
paintings executed in oil on canvas: the 
coefficient  of  DMED  is  at  9.98  and  is 
statistically  significant.  The  orientation 
of  the  canvas  (portrait  or  landscape) 
appears  to  have  no  bearing  on  our 
results, as the coefficient of ORIENTD is 
not significant. The inclusion of Appel in 
the sample appears to cause the expected 
(P-L)  to  shrink,  thus  increasing  the 
likelihood of overestimation.  While this 
result  is  consistent  with  the  statistics 
presented  in  Table  1,  we  are  surprised 
that the coefficient for Klee is not larger 
in  absolute  value  and  more  significant 
than  that  for  Appel.  Artworks  by  Klee 
appear overestimated to a greater extent 
than those by Appel according to Table 
1.  It  is  thus  puzzling  why  Appel  alone 
shows  a  significant  coefficient  in  this 
regression.  It  is  also  puzzling  why  he 
should  be  overestimated  to  a  greater 
extent in relation to Mirro or Kandinsky, 
for  Appel  has  the  lowest  market 
valuation  of  the  four.  This  result  is  at 
odds with studies that suggest a tendency 
to  overestimate  expensive,  prestigious 
pieces  of  art  [Mei  and  Moses,  (2005)]. 
For  the  remaining  regressors,  the 
standard  error  of  the  estimated 
coefficients  is  too  large  to  draw  any 
meaningful conclusions.  
Another  striking  result  is  that 
equation  (14)  has  a  much  lower 
explanatory  power  than  equation  (16). 
The adjusted R-square for equation (16) 
is 36.5%, while the adjusted R-square for 
equation (14) is a meager 9%. Equation 
(15) is obviously a linear combination of 
the  other  two.  This  difference  is 
consistent with our conjecture illustrated 
by  equations  (12)  and  (13).  We  have Economic Interferences  AE 
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hypothesized that E(P) – L is explained 
by  the  width  of  the  estimation  window 
only when the transaction takes place at a 
price above the reservation price. When 
the  painting  is  sold  at  the  reservation 
price, E(P) – L  should be explained only 
by an unobservable variable R, which is 
the difference between the observed low 
estimate and the reservation price S. In 
light  of  this  argument,  model  (14)  is 
obviously  under-specified.  By  contrast, 
model (16) appears better specified: E(P) 
– H
A is explained in all instances by the 
width  of  the  estimation  window, 
although when the painting is sold at the 
reservation  price,  R  represents  an 
additional  unobservable  explanatory 
variable. While one can argue that model 
(16)  is  also  under-specified,  it  is, 
however,  clear  that  is  better  specified 
than (14). Our results fully confirm this 
contention
3. 
We also estimate the following 
alternative model specification: 
 
 
L/P = a0 + a1[(H
A –L)/P] + aiΣ Xi + e 
  (17) 
 
M/P = b0 + b1[(H
A –L)/P] + aiΣ Xi + e  
 (18) 
 
H/P = c0 + c1[(H
A –L)/P] + aiΣ Xi + e  
 (19) 
 
Here  again,  we  expect  that  the 
specification in  model (19) would have 
more  explanatory  power  than  the 
specification in model (17) for the same 
reasons discussed above. Model (17) is 
less  well  specified  than  model  (19), 
because  (H
A  –L)/P  explains  the 
dependent  variable  only  when  the 
transaction  takes  place  above  the 
reservation  price.  In  model  (19),  even 
though  R  is  still  missing,  (H
A  –L)/P 
continues  to  have  explanatory  power 
even when the transaction takes place at 
the  reservation  price.  We  also 
hypothesize that the coefficients of (H
A –
L)/P  in  all  three  equations  should  be 
positive. 
 
Table 3. Regression results. The relative price distance from the low estimate (L/P), estimation window mid-point 
(M/P). and high estimate (H
A/P) is regressed against the observed relative width of the estimation window (H
A-L), 
a series of dummy variables accounting for the identity of the painters (MIRRO, APPEL, KLEE), the medium used 
(DMED =1 for oil on canvas), the orientation of the canvas (ORIENTD =1 for landscape-oriented canvases, the 
years 1987 through 2003 (Y1987 – Y2003), the location of the auction (PARISD = 1 for Paris, NYCD = 1, for 
New  York,  LONDOND  =  1  for  London,  AMSTERD  =  1  for  Amsterdam),    and  the  auctioneer  (CHRISTIE, 
SOTHEBYS). All regression coefficients are un-standardized. T-Statistics significant at the level of 5% and below 
are identified with *. 
 
  L/P      M/P      H
A/P     
     Std. Error  t  Sig.  Std. Error  t  Sig.  Std. Error  t 
                 
Const.  0.885 0.067 13.308* 0.885 0.067  13.308 0.885 0.067 13.308
 MIRO  -0.0113 0.039 -0.294 -0.0113 0.039  -0.294 -0.0113 0.039 -0.294
 APPEL  0.125 0.040 0.317 0.125 0.040  0.317 0.125 0.040 0.317
 KLEE  0.02 0.041 0.502 0.02 0.041  0.502 0.02 0.041 0.502
 DMED  -0.006 0.023 -0.279 -0.006 0.023  -0.279 -0.006 0.023 -0.279
 ORIENTD  -0.015 0.020 -0.759 -0.015 0.020  -0.759 -0.015 0.020 -0.759
 Y1987  0.08 0.107 0.754 0.08 0.107  0.754 0.08 0.107 0.754
 Y1988  -0.027 0.114 -0.242 -0.027 0.114  -0.242 -0.027 0.114 -0.242
 Y1989  -0.084 0.118 -0.710 -0.084 0.118  -0.710 -0.084 0.118 -0.710
 Y1990  -0.0074 0.091 -0.081 -0.0074 0.091  -0.081 -0.0074 0.091 -0.081
 Y1991  0.167 0.163 1.024 0.167 0.163  1.024 0.167 0.163 1.024
 Y1992  0.146 0.080 1.831* 0.146 0.080  1.831 0.146 0.080 1.831
 Y1993  0.009 0.061 0.151 0.009 0.061  0.151 0.009 0.061 0.151
 Y1994  0.114 0.060 1.907* 0.114 0.060  1.907 0.114 0.060 1.907AE  Economic Interferences 
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 Y1995  0.034 0.060 0.568 0.034 0.060  0.568 0.034 0.060 0.568
 Y1996  0.093 0.059 1.566 0.093 0.059  1.566 0.093 0.059 1.566
 Y1997  0.079 0.058 1.371 0.079 0.058  1.371 0.079 0.058 1.371
 Y1998  0.033 0.056 0.594 0.033 0.056  0.594 0.033 0.056 0.594
 Y1999  -0.047 0.057 -0.822 -0.047 0.057  -0.822 -0.047 0.057 -0.822
 Y2000  0.068 0.061 1.120 0.068 0.061  1.120 0.068 0.061 1.120
 Y2001  0.004 0.059 0.074 0.004 0.059  0.074 0.004 0.059 0.074
 Y2002  0.021 0.059 0.351 0.021 0.059  0.351 0.021 0.059 0.351
 Y2003  0.025 0.072 0.354 0.025 0.072  0.354 0.025 0.072 0.354
 PARISD  -0.151 0.044 -3.424* -0.151 0.044  -3.424 -0.151 0.044 -3.424
 NYCD  0.049 0.063 0.777 0.049 0.063  0.777 0.049 0.063 0.777
 LONDOND  0.02 0.063 0.317 0.02 0.063  0.317 0.02 0.063 0.317
 AMSTERD  0.043 0.067 0.636 0.043 0.067  0.636 0.043 0.067 0.636
 CHRISTIE  -0.193 0.063 -3.053* -0.193 0.063  -3.053 -0.193 0.063 -3.053
 SOTHEBYS  -0.147 0.065 -2.282* -0.147 0.065  -2.282 -0.147 0.065 -2.282
 (H
A-L)/P  0.281 0.019 14.497* 0.781 0.019  40.306* 1.281 0.019 66.116*
   
Adj-R2  0.1 0.42   0.665
F-statistic  9.8* 60.1*   157*
 
Results are presented in Table 3. 
The coefficients of (H
A –L)/P are indeed 
positive  (0.281,  0.781,  and  1.281)  and 
significant. As predicted the explanatory 
power of equation (19) is much higher at 
66.7%, compared to that of equation (17) 
at only 10%. The other coefficients are in 
general  consistent  with  the  previous 
specification.  The  coefficients  for 
Christie’s  and  Sotheby’s  are  now  both 
significant, indicating a lower likelihood 
of overestimation. It is conceivable that 
Sotheby’s  and  Christie’s  bargaining 
position in dealing with art collectors is 
stronger than that of other lesser known 
auction houses; hence, their experts can 
resist  the  pressure  to  set  higher 
reservation  prices.  Of  course,  the 
argument  of  conservatism  cannot  be 
completely  dismissed,  but  the  case  for 
reservation prices is very strong.  
Another interesting result is the 
lower  chance  of  overestimation 
occurring  in  Paris.  In  the  post-World 
War  II  era,  the  art  hype  has  migrated 
from Paris to New York, where the bid-
up of art prices has been amplified by the 
wealth  flowing  from  the  New  York 
Stock  Exchange  and  the  proximity  of 
Wall Street. Whether New York deserves 
its newfound status of art capital of the 
world remains an issue to be debated by 
art  critics  and  historians.  We  simply 
speculate that this could be one possible 
argument explaining our results. 
 
Conclusions 
   
The  question  of  whether  the 
midpoint  of  the  estimation  interval  is 
indeed an unbiased estimator of hammer 
prices  at  art  auctions  has  elicited 
substantial  attention  lately.  The  results 
are mixed; some studies find an upward 
bias,  some  find  a  downward  bias,  and 
some other find no bias at all.  
We  produce  here  a  new 
hypothesis  that  hopefully  sheds  more 
light on the existing empirical riddle. We 
argue  that  the  key  element  to 
understanding  the  dynamic  of  pre-
auction estimates and hammer prices is 
the reservation price. The existence of a 
reservation  price  sometimes  forces  the 
auction house to revise its lower estimate 
upwards  (but  not  necessarily  the  high 
estimate,  which  is  not  subject  to  any 
particular exogenous constraints), hence 
creating  the  appearance  of 
overestimation  with  respect  to  the 
midpoint of the estimation window.  The 
extent to which the auctioneer will adjust 
the  estimate  depends  on  the  bargaining 
power held by the owner of the artwork, Economic Interferences  AE 
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which in turn is a function of particular 
market  conditions.  We  conjecture  that 
the  observed  low  estimate  is  a  linear 
transformation  of  the  secret  reservation 
price. As a corollary, the low pre-auction 
estimate  should  be  taken  as  a  more 
powerful, precise and accurate predictor 
of hammer prices.  
To test our hypothesis we utilize 
a panel data sample consisting of 2,308 
abstract paintings by Paul Klee, Wassily 
Kandinsky, Juan Miro, and Karel Appel. 
We have purposely selected only abstract 
art  in  order  to  control  for  the  hard-to-
quantify influence of subject matter. Our 
results  document  unequivocal 
overestimation  of  abstract  art.  We  also 
find  that  indeed,  the  low  pre-auction 
estimate  appears  as  a  more  powerful, 
accurate and a lower variance predictor 
of hammer prices than the high estimate. 
There is enough circumstantial evidence 
to suggest that what other earlier studies 
have observed could be due in part to the 
influence  of  reservation  prices  in  the 
context  of  particular  market  conditions. 
For  example,  the  findings  of  Mei  and 
Moses (2005) can be interpreted in a new 
light. Artworks that are perceived to have 
a  very  high  market  valuation  might 
appear  overestimated  simply  because 
their  sellers  would  require  a  high 
reservation price to match the clout and 
glamour of their paintings.  
In  the  end,  we  have  obtained 
these  results  using  a  relatively  simple 
methodology and relying heavily on the 
results  brought  forward  by  previous 
studies. Yet we feel that our contribution 
is insightful. We believe that we are able 
to account for the incongruous findings 
observed  so  far  in  a  better  way  than 
before. We hope that future research will 
confirm our view. 
 
End notes 
1 Miro – considered one of the most original modern artists – is also known for proposing 
exotic concepts, such as four dimensional painting 
2  Oil  on  canvas  pieces  have  always  been  considered  somewhat  more  valuable  than 
watercolors, tempera, and acrylics, caeteris paribus. Oil is the most versatile medium, 
adaptable  to  a  dazzling  array  of  techniques,  methods,  and  artistic  currents;  an 
overwhelming majority of masterpieces are oil on canvas. In addition to being so flexible 
and artistically subtle, oil on canvas is also extremely durable; it is the most likely to 
endure the passage of time 
3 We also estimated a specification that accounts for the interaction between (HA-L) and 
the dummies representing Sotheby’s and Christie’s. Since the results are consistent with 
equation (17), (18), and (19) but do not add much in terms of explanatory power, we 
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